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Abstract 
This paper aims to explain the varying impact of the Olympic Games on the fulfilment of the 
right to housing in host cities. Drawing on a theoretical framework grounded on literature on 
public private partnerships and network management, a qualitative comparative analysis of 5 
editions between 1996 and 2012 was carried out. Combined with two case studies, this 
research identifies the salience of civil society actors and the presence of corruption as 
explanatory factors for the varying impact of the Games on the right to housing. 
 
Key words: Olympic Games, Impact, Housing Rights, Network Governance, Representation, 
Corruption. 
 
Introduction 
Sports is claimed to unite people despite their differences. In line with this, the Olympic 
Movement aims to “contribute to building a peaceful and better world” and the promotion of 
social development and equality through its primary means of a sports competition 
(International Olympic Committee, 2016a). In addition to these normative goals, the event is 
linked to numerous expected benefits including improved means of transportation and urban 
renewal (Cashman 2002, 5-7), economic and environmental improvement and an effective 
means of city marketing (Essex and Chalkley 2004). 
Despite this rhetoric, recent editions of the Games show that the Olympic reality is not 
associated with exclusively positive effects. The negative impact of the games is illustrated by 
forced evictions of 1,5 million residents for the 2008 Beijing Games (Beck, 2007), 22000 
displaced families and a rise of 103% in police killings in Rio (Gibson, 2016) and severe 
violations of workers’ rights in the run-up to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013). More and more people are advocating to host the Olympic in one or a few 
cities instead of moving it around, to limit the negative effects associated with the events 
requiring major investments (Short, 2015). 
A review of existing research on the legacy and impact of the Olympic Games reveals 
that the Olympic reality shows mixed effects. Some researchers report improvements in 
economics (Dick & Wang) employment (Hotchkiss et al., 2002) and tourism (Duran, 2002). 
In contrast, others find negative effects on the economy (Baade & Baumann, 2008), air 
quality (Chen et al., 2011) and benefits for socially excluded and minority groups (Minnaert, 
2011). Because most studies are of descriptive rather than explanatory nature and focus on 
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establishing the impact of one or a few editions rather than exploring why the effects take this 
shape, it remains unclear why the impact differs across editions.  
Few studies focus on the negative and unwanted effects of the games. Despite the 
controversy around the human rights aspects of recent editions of the Olympic Games (cf. 
Human Rights Watch, 2014), this area is limitedly addressed in existing research. The right to 
housing, codified in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is 
particularly relevant because of the major impact of the Games on the built environment, 
which can give rise to opportunities and challenges regarding housing issues. As a result, the 
games are associated with differing impacts in this field that remain unexplained. 
Following the necessity of explanatory research, this paper will study the following 
question: Why do the Olympic Games have a varying impact on the fulfilment of the right to 
housing in its host environment? The organisation of the Olympic Games will be explained as 
a public private partnership. Combining literature on network management with insights on 
public-private partnerships, this paper seeks to establish how the interactions between actors 
and interests lead to varying impacts across editions. Thereby, it contributes to the existing 
bodies of literature on public-private partnerships, network management and mega-events and 
their impact. Furthermore, this project is associated with strong societal relevance. Identifying 
factors and actors contributing to the impact of the games can help guide policy and improve 
conduct in future editions of the Olympic Games and similar mega events.  
 
Theoretical Framework: Explaining Network Outcomes through Composition and 
Salience 
The OCOG as a Problem Solving Network 
The organisation of the Olympic Games is in the hands of an Organising Committee of the 
Olympic Games (OCOG) mandated by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the 
National Olympic Committee (NOC). The OCOG includes several stakeholder 
representatives including the IOC, NOC and the public and private sector (International 
Olympic Committee, 2016c). In addition, several complex networks form in relation to the 
OCOG, which include stakeholders from domains as advocacy and the public and private 
sector. 
 In essence, every OCOG is a public-private partnership formed to realise the Olympic 
Games. Cooperation between actors is necessary to achieve the common goal of organising 
the Olympics. In light of the common goal and stakeholders’ cross-cutting or diverging 
interests, efficient management of the stakeholders is necessary to achieve a successful and 
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mutually beneficial result (Agha et al, 2011). Furthermore, following Provan and Kenis 
(2008), the OCOG partnership functions as a network administrative organisation (NAO) 
managing the related networks through coordinating efforts, acquiring and (re)distributing 
funds and deciding on the partnership’s direction and desired outcomes.  
Theories of multi-stakeholder networks and network management provide insights in 
the dynamics between the stakeholders in and related to the OCOG partnership. Just like 
public-private partnerships, multi-stakeholder networks are established in response to 
complex issues that cannot be solved by a single actor and are composed of agents from 
various sectors including the public, private and civil society sphere (Roloff, 2008). Although 
OCOGs have a somewhat formalized hierarchical structure in which certain actors are board 
members and others are not, it is a network organisation rather than a hierarchical 
organisation. It has several characteristics common to network organisations such as 
interdependence between actors, lacking uniformity regarding actor’s backgrounds, agendas 
en interests, and a flexible power structure varying across issue areas because different actors 
take the lead in different areas (de Bruin & ten Heuvelhof, 2008, 14-23). More specifically, 
OCOGs are problem solving networks (Milward & Provan, 2006, 14-16) created to solve the 
‘problem’ of organising the Olympics.  
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the OCOG in solving the problem of 
organising the Olympics, it is crucial to look at the different levels in which its practices take 
effect. Often, networks have a specific aim but serve various groups including the 
communities in which they are embedded, the clients whose needs they address and the 
network members’ interests. An evaluative approach integrating these different levels of 
effectiveness facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of network effectiveness 
(Provan & Milward, 2001). This approach takes into account several criteria of effectiveness, 
including costs to the community, organisation of the network, network membership, amount, 
type and quality of services provided and outcomes for clients (Provan & Milward, 2001, 
416). Application of these insights to the OCOGs shows that, regarding housing issues, there 
is network effectiveness variance at the community level. This could be explained by the 
NAO (the OCOG) acting or not acting as an agent of a particular constituency (i.e. the 
community, the network actors, the clients) (Provan and Milward, 2001, 421). This could 
imply that public, private or civil society actors are not (equally) represented or otherwise not 
able to defend or promote its interests in the OCOG. Because the impact of the Olympics on 
housing rights manifests itself in the community sphere, the variance in impact between 
editions could be due to variances in representation of community actors in the OCOG.  
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Composition OCOG 
In order to better understand how representation of various actors within the OCOG 
influences its outcomes on the right to housing, decision-making processes in partnerships 
and networks will be explored. Decision making in the OCOG is complex due to its internal 
structure and the interdependencies between actors. As a result, network actors will negotiate 
(part of) a solution to the common problem in different rounds. New topics may emerge in 
new rounds, or previous agreements may be renegotiated (de Bruin & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). 
Thus, the varying impact could be explained by the importance attributed to the impact, 
determining whether it is part of the negotiations or not brought to the table.  
the composition of the partnership or network in terms of the types of actors included 
in it can explain outcomes of decision making processes in public-private partnerships. It has 
been argued, although not undisputed, that non-profit organisations, especially when lacking 
competition with others as is the case for the OCOG, provide better quality outcomes because 
they can reinvest their revenues and are less focussed on financial gains than for-profit 
organisations (Milward et al, 2010, 129-130). Additionally, organisational performance is 
positively related to the amount and type of links between the organisation and relevant 
environmental actors (Akkerman & Torenvlied, 2011). This implies that an OCOG with more 
and stronger links to actors relevant to the right to housing (i.e. advocacy groups) will have a 
more positive performance regarding housing rights compared to their counterparts with few 
or weak connections.  
Furthermore, the OCOG needs to balance between the public and private benefits 
earned, which is a complicated process. Usually, local governments occupy a coordinating 
role, whereas private actors take care of technicalities. Civil society actors are associated with 
more accessibility and equitability of goods and services (Baud & Dhanalakshmi, 2008, 149-
151) As noted by Andranovich et al. (2001, 127-128), the relations within the committees of 
American host-cities have been skewed towards the private side due to lacking funds from 
public actors and a less pronounced role for these actors in the bidding stage. This can lead to 
accountability problems and tensions between public and private interests. Furthermore, poor 
implementation of ideas set forward in the partnership, skewed incentives and unintended 
consequences can be reasons for unbalanced public and private benefits (Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2011, 8).   
The theoretical framework presented above points to the relevance of particular actors 
such as non-profit -, for-profit -, community -, or housing rights actors in determining 
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partnership outcomes. If not (equally) represented in the partnership or strongly embedded in 
the network, these actors will not be able to advance their interests in the negotiation process 
or influence network partners. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The varying impact of the Olympic games on the right to housing across 
editions can be explained by different configurations of the OCOG, in other words, the (type 
of) actors included in or connected to the partnership mandated to organise a specific edition 
of the Olympic Games. 
 
Salience OCOG 
 In addition to the composition of the OCOG, decision making processes and 
associated outcomes can be understood by examining the power relations apparent in the 
OCOG partnership. Individual partnership actors can posses the power to produce or block 
outcomes or have more diffuse powers (de Bruin & ten Heuvelhof, 2008). Hence, power 
relations determine what initiatives are put forward and struck down. The ability of individual 
actors to influence or determine partnership decisions is determined by issue specific 
expertise and influence (Roloff, 2007), power (i.e. coercive or financial power), legitimacy 
and urgency (Mitchell et al, 1997). Furthermore, centrality and embeddedness of a specific 
actor in the OCOG determines its influence on the network, on the condition that the network 
no longer is in the emerging-stage (Provan et al., 2009). For the OCOG this would entail that 
an actor advocating housing rights that is strongly embedded in the network is able to 
effectively influence the network’s behaviour some time after it was established. All in all, a 
combination of factors determines the salience of individual actors in the OCOG partnership 
and associated network. This salience influences the extent to which individual stakeholders 
influence the network’s behaviour regarding the issue at hand, for instance through agenda 
setting, coercion or funding. 
Lastly, the OCOG can deal with the context in which it operates in various ways, 
which can determine the success of the initiative. Several success conditions of multi-
stakeholder initiatives in urban areas have been identified and include the recognition of 
common interest and trust in diverse communities, clear accountability in the delegation of 
tasks, information and funding, prior agreement on the goals, means and proposed outcomes 
of the initiative, fit in to the local context, appropriateness of the legal framework, 
accountability to diverse groups and recognition of corruption (Baud & Dhanalakshmi, 2008, 
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154-155). These factors are expected to influence the impact of the Olympic Games on its 
host environment.  
As pointed out above, the outcomes of a partnership can be understood through the 
power relations influencing its negotiation process. Some actors have a stronger position 
within the partnership, enabling them to influence the decision making process and promote 
their interests. Several factors such as expertise and embeddedness in the network determine 
this position. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The salience of individual stakeholders within the OCOG influences the 
magnitude of the impact of a specific edition of the Olympic Games. 
 
Design and Case Selection 
In order to analyse the effect of the characteristics of different OCOGs on the fulfilment of 
housing rights, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) will be utilized. Rather than 
identifying (the significance of) a single causal pathway as happens in most statistical 
analyses, QCA allows for the exploration of multiple conjunctional causation (Berg-Schlosser 
et al, 2012). Instead of looking for one model consisting of additive variables that best fits the 
characteristics of all cases, it seeks to identify the different causal pathways bringing about a 
consequence through comparing the characteristics of several cases against one another 
(Schlosser et al, 2012). These causal chains take the form of (combinations of) necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions for an effect to appear or have a certain magnitude. The usage of 
truth tables in QCA allows for a systematic approach towards similarities and differences 
between cases, making QCA particularly fit to deal with causal complexity (Ragin, 1999). 
Through QCA it is possible to identify the necessary and/or sufficient factors, as hypothesised 
above, causing a particular effect on the right to housing. Thereby the varying impact of the 
right to housing as apparent in the cases included in the analysis can be explained. Dependent 
upon the quality of the dataset and the type and amount of cases included, QCA results could 
be generalized across other cases. The raw data table, truth tables and other output for the 
QCA will be published in the appendices.  
QCA is said to hold the middle ground between qualitative (case study) and 
quantitative approaches. It is particularly fit to analyse small- to medium-n datasets, but the 
translation of empirical data to Boolean or numeric values is reminiscent of quantitative 
analysis. QCA analyses require development of theoretically informed factors and 
categorization of the cases accordingly. In order to accommodate the nuances associated with 
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the variables included in this research, fuzzy set QCA will be used. This method allows for 
partial membership in categories (Ragin, 2012), thereby honouring the explanatory power of 
these small differences. This is not a possibility in crisp set QCA, where only full membership 
is possible. 
For this analysis, five editions of the Olympic Games between 1996 and 2012 have 
been selected: Atlanta, Sydney, Athens, Beijing and London. Although a larger amount of 
cases would be beneficial for the QCA because it would allow more elaborate testing of 
causal combinations, this timeline was chosen because not all required data was available pre-
1996 and post-2012. Furthermore, it helped to make data collection feasible within the time 
and resource constraints.  
For QCA it is important that the cases show enough contextual similarities to be 
comparable, but still present enough variation on both the outcome and conditions included in 
the model (i.e. Rihoux, 2003). Therefore, these cases have been selected following a most-
similar cases design, where contextual factors are the same and differences in outcome can 
thus be explained by those factors that are not similar. In order to achieve this design, the 
following steps have been taken. First, the project will have a specific focus on the urban 
region where the Games are held. Second, only summer Olympics are included in the 
analysis, as the impact of winter Olympics is expected to be different because of their 
location. Third, the analysis focusses only on the organising partnership. In most cases this 
will be the OCOG, however in some cases additional bodies taking on specific responsibilities 
were established. In case of such joint responsibility, these bodies are considered part of the 
organising partnership. Lastly, in order to control for the potential effects of corruption, the 
Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index for the relevant years has been 
included as a control variable (Baud & Dhanalakshmi, 2008, 154-155). 
The QCA will provide the possible combinations of factors necessary or sufficient to 
bring about a certain outcome. However, it does not explain how these factors interact and 
why that particular combination brings about that specific outcome. The ambition of this 
project is not just to identify factors bringing about a certain effect, but also to understand 
how and why this happens. In order achieve this, an in-depth analysis of two cases will be 
carried out complementary to the QCA. In addition to the advantage pointed out above, 
carrying out case studies enables cross-validation of the findings and identification of 
additional factors or mechanisms that have not been taken in to account in the qualitative 
content analysis. The factors identified in the literature review that have not been dealt with in 
the hypotheses, especially those suggested by Baud & Dhanalakshmi (2008), will be taken 
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into account in the case study. The case studies will focus on the 2000 Sydney and 2004 
Athens Olympic Games. These cases have been selected following the most similar cases 
design. Through an in-depth analysis, the case studies can help identify why certain factors 
carry explanatory power, which cannot be achieved by the QCA. The case study will be 
conducted on the basis of secondary literature including official OCOG reports, scholarly and 
newspaper articles and government documents.  
 
Variables and Operationalization 
 In order to accurately measure the variables incorporated in the analysis, the following 
section will discuss the operationalization. The dependent variable measures the impact of the 
Games on the fulfilment of the right to housing in the Games’ host cities. In order to do so, 
the change in the right to housing as caused by the Olympic Games has to be measured. 
Ideally, a comparison between the status before and after the games have been hosted will be 
made, however detailed and comparable data on the variances in indicators of the right to 
housing (i.e. homelessness, housing affordability) on the local or regional level is not 
available.  
In 2007, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions published a report on the effects 
of mega-events on housing rights. The report includes detailed case studies on the impact of 
Olympic editions included in this study on various dimensions of the right to housing. The 
data was collected through fact finding missions carried out by COHRE researchers (7; 18-
19). The indicators, namely forced evictions, resettlement and compensation, housing 
affordability, availability of low-cost and social housing, affected groups and potential 
discrimination (2007, 18) are in accordance with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner of Human Rights’ conception of the right to housing (3-6, 21-23). Being a 
rather elaborate and detailed description of the impact of the Games on housing rights makes 
it a perfect source of data for this research project. The data for Beijing and London will be 
cross-checked with other sources, because the report was published prior to the hosting of 
these events. Major discrepancies between the report and the data are not expected, because 
the plans were developed and the building phase was well underway at the time of 
publication.  
 The information provided in the report has been coded to allow for its use in QCA. 
Due to the multi-faceted nature of housing rights the impact often is rather complex. 
Violations can differ in type, amount or severity, both within and between cases. 
Conceptually, evicting 500 or 2000 people is ‘just as bad’ because in both instances human 
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rights law is broken. Intuitively there is a difference between the two examples, because the 
latter involves more people suffering from it. Comparing two different violations poses 
similar problems. It is impossible to objectively measure which, if either, is worse. These 
issues will be addressed through classifying impacts as light negative impact (0.3), moderate 
negative impact (0.6) and strong negative impact (0.9). In making this classification, the 
amount, type and magnitude of violations will be considered.  
 Table 1 presents information on the independent variables included in the analysis. 
Additionally, a coding scheme detailing the coding criteria per category is provided in 
appendix 1. Data for the independent variables will be drawn from the official reports 
published by the relevant OCOG, because these reports reflect upon various dimensions of the 
organisation process and roughly address the same issues. This makes them the most 
comparable source available. Although potential bias does exist, this is not anticipated to be 
problematic for this analysis as only information on the partnership members and their power 
and expertise are deduced from them. In some instances additional sources have been used.  
In addition to table 1 and appendix 1, the indicators for measuring salience require 
some additional information on conceptualization. Following Mitchell et al (1997, 869) power 
is the ability to make other actors do what the stakeholder wants. A stakeholder has power if it 
“can gain access to a coercive, utilitarian or normative means, to impose its will in the 
relationship.” (Mitchell et al., 1997, 865). In the OCOG an actor controlling funds 
(Andranovich, 2001), mandated with the power to decide, corresponding to strong 
representation in the partnership, or holding strong leverage over other stakeholder is 
considered powerful. Furthermore, expertise influences the salience of a stakeholder in a 
partnership. Expertise is operationalized as knowledge or skills not (equally) possessed or 
easily invoked by other stakeholders in the partnership. Other than knowledge and skills, 
access to people, networks, services or materials will also be seen as expertise.  
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Variable 
 
What does it 
measure? 
Measure Coding Fs/QCA 
calibration 
Notes 
Configuration 
of network 
Type of stakeholders 
included in 
partnership, 
categorized as public, 
private or civil 
society (Roloff, 
2008). 
Present if: Membership in 
one of the committees 
related to the OCOG, or 
having in place formal 
arrangements securing the 
stakeholder’s influence. 
Absent if: none of the 
above.  
0=absent 
1=present 
 IOC and NOC members in the 
partnership are not taken into 
account. As noted by the IOC 
(2016c), every organising 
committee includes NOC and IOC 
members; this constant factor can 
therefore not explain differences in 
outcome. 
Salience of 
stakeholder 
Stakeholder’s ability 
to influence the 
network’s behaviour 
and decisions 
An index of power 
(Mitchell et al, 1997, 869) 
and expertise (Roloff, 
2007).   
Public and 
private actors: 0 
= no salience; 1 
= very salient. 
Civil society 
actors: 0 = very 
salient; 1 = no 
salience.  
Non-
membership 
value: 0  
Full-
membership 
value: 1 
Crossover 
point: 0.5  
The values for civil society actors 
have been inversed (1-original 
value), because weaker civil 
society actors are expected to be 
associated with stronger negative 
impacts on housing rights.  
Legitimacy (Mitchell et al, 1997) 
was omitted as an indicator 
because the potential sources of 
legitimacy were too widespread to 
analyse with the available data. 
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This would compromise the 
reliability and validity of the 
project. Urgency (Mitchell et al, 
1997) was omitted as indicator 
because this research deals with 
the general configuration of the 
OCOG rather than with specific 
time-sensitive and critical issues in 
the organisation process.   
Corruption Perceived level of 
corruption in host 
state. 
Inversed Corruption 
Perception Index 
(Transparency International, 
2017) 
0 = Least corrupt 
10 = Most 
corrupt  
Non-
membership 
value: 0 
Full-
membership 
value: 10 
Crossover 
point: 5 
Until 2011, CPIs were scored on a 
0-10 scale (10 being the least 
corrupt). The 2012 index is scored 
on a scale from 0-100. This score 
has been divided by 10 to be in the 
same order as the other indexes.  
Furthermore, the original data was 
inversed.  
Table 1: Operationalization Independent & Control Variables 
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Assessing the Impact of the Olympic Games on their Host Environment 
This section will analyse and interpret the effect of the factors outlined above on the 
fulfilment of housing rights. The results of the QCA analysis will be discussed, followed by 
two case studies. The aim is to gain a deeper understanding of how the causal chains 
established by the QCA result in the specific outcome they are associated with. A secondary 
aim is to provide a preliminary exploration of how the additional conditions presented in the 
literature review impact housing rights. Following the case studies, the results are interpreted 
in light of each edition’s characteristics and the theoretical framework presented previously. 
The impact of each edition on the fulfilment of housing rights is presented in table 1. The raw 
data table, including the coding of each edition, can be found in appendix 2.  
   
Outcomes of the QCA 
Because public, private and civil society actors are represented in all partnerships 
included in the analysis there is no variance on this variable, meaning that this cannot explain 
the varying outcome. In other words, hypothesis 1 cannot be tested with the current data. 
Therefore, the analysis will focus on hypothesis 2 concerning the salience of particular actors 
in the partnership. The truth table associated with this analysis can be found in appendix 3. 
Following the QCA procedure, all configurations that did not occur were deleted from the 
analysis (Ragin & Davey, 2016; Kent, 2008). All instances with a consistency score above 0.9 
(Kent, 2008, 6), signalling sufficient consistency between the causal combination and the 
outcome, were selected for further analysis. 
The most parsimonious solution of the analysis shows that weak civil society actors 
(consistency=0.97) or high corruption (consistency=1) are sufficient conditions for negative 
impacts on housing rights to occur. The intermediate and complex solutions demonstrate that 
strong public and private actors and high corruption (consistency=1) or strong public and 
private actors and weak civil society actors (consistency=0.97) are sufficient causal 
combinations for negative impacts on housing rights to manifest. The analysis established no 
necessary conditions. The QCA output is published in appendix 4, together with plots 
illustrating the relationship between various (combinations of) factors on the Games’ impact 
on housing rights. 
 
	 14	Type of Impact Atlanta 1996  
 (COHRE, 2007, 120- 
125) 
Sydney 2000 
(COHRE, 2007, 131-
137) 
Athens 2004 
(COHRE, 2007, 
146-152) 
Beijing 2008 
(COHRE, 2007, 145-155; 
159-168) 
London 2012 
(COHRE, 2007, 169, 
172-187) 
Evictions 30000 displacements 
and evictions 
Insufficient assistance 
in relocation 
Poor evidence for 
direct effect Olympics 
on evictions 
2700 forced 
evictions 
Violent evictions 
with damage to 
personal property 
1,5 million evictions  
Lack of due process 
Harassment in the eviction 
process 
No or too little 
compensation 
1000 evictions 
Homeless Criminalisation of 
homelessness (9000 
arrest citations)  
Minimal harassment 
homeless people 
Persecution of 
homeless, addicts 
and asylum seekers 
  
Affordability Demolition of low cost 
and social housing 
Increasing house prices 
& rents 
Increasing housing 
prices and rents 
No increase in 
housing prices 
 Increase in housing 
prices 
50% of the venues 
repurposed as affordable 
housing 
Specific Groups Disproportionate effect 
on racial minorities and 
the poor 
Stronger negative 
impact on minority 
groups (i.e. 
indigenous groups) 
Strong negative 
impact for Roma 
people 
Repression of housing rights 
advocates 
Stronger impact for 
Gypsy/Traveller 
communities 
Table 2: Olympic Games Impact Housing Rights 
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Case Study: Sydney 2000 
 The Olympic Games in Sydney were framed as a means to enhance gentrification and 
promote development of recreational infrastructure. The organisation was heavily integrated 
into the government (SOCOG, 2001, 25-27), resulting in the creation of several governmental 
bodies for Olympic purposes including a ministerial position. Furthermore, public authorities 
provided part of the funding (The Audit Office of New South Wales, 1998). Both public and 
private actors score high on expertise because their areas of expertise are considered 
complementary (SOCOG, 2001, 72-73; 87-89; 157). Resulting from providing a large 
proportion of funding private actors score moderately on the power dimension (The Audit 
Office of New South Wales, 1998). Australia is known for its varied population including 
aboriginal groups. These and other civil society actors have been involved in the organisation 
process through formal representation in the SOCOG and various committees, dealing with 
issues specific to the groups involved (SOCOG, 2001, 133). This allowed civil society actors 
to exercise power and utilize their unique expertise. Despite this, the actual impact of these 
consultations on outcomes is disputed (Owen, 2001). Furthermore, the extent that vulnerable 
groups in housing issues such as people with a low income, the mentally ill, and young people 
that have had to leave home (COHRE, 2007, 135-137) were effectively incorporated in the 
decision making process is questionable. 
Arguably, the Olympics were part of the gentrification tendency already taking place 
within Sydney prior to the bidding phase (Blunden, 2007, 18) and used as a means within this 
context inducing further city development. An example is the development of the primary 
facilities at Homebush Bay, an industrial brownfield area in Sydney (SOCOG, 2001, 53; 
Owen, 2001). Alongside this location the Olympic Village was situated at Newington, a 
former navy armaments depot (SOCOG, 2001, 70). It contributed to city redevelopments and 
gentrification that were already taking place in Sydney. Furthermore, either location did not 
involve residential areas, limiting the necessity of evictions in the run-up to the Olympics.  
Still, housing related issues were prevalent in the Olympic process. There was no 
explicit agreement in the partnership on housing issues during the bidding stage, except the 
promise that no acquisition of private land would be necessary for the organisation of the 
Games (Blunden, 2007, 12). Still, various concerns were raised by civil society actors. 
Because of the selection of appropriate locations for the Olympic infrastructure evictions were 
not the prime concern related to these Games. Rather, escalation of housing prices and rights 
of homeless people were the core areas of concern. Already in 1994 NGOs and activists 
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started organising themselves and calling attention to these issues, however this did not lead 
to significant government action (Blunden, 2007, 15; Lenskyj, 2002). Although, the 
Government was passing a variety of acts increasing surveillance and police powers in public 
spaces which could negatively impact the right of homeless people (Blunden, 2007, 18), these 
powers were hardly used (p. 18). Additionally, the Government reiterated that the homeless 
will not be harassed unless their security or that of others was compromised (Blunden, 2007, 
25). Furthermore, special outreach workers were appointed in order to facilitate 
communications with the homeless (Blunden, 2007, 26). In the end, only very few instances 
of harassment of homeless people were reported (Blunden, 2007, 27). 
The other concern of advocates in the Olympic context was increasing housing prices. 
In an already tight housing market, especially regarding social housing, advocates feared that 
housing would become unaffordable. Approaching the Olympics, there were compelling 
signals that the Olympics had a strong effect on vastly increasing rents (Hall & Hodgens, 11-
12), such as a stronger increase in areas adjacent to the Olympic neighbourhood and corridor 
(Lenskyj, 2002) and significant increases in inquiries on rent increases at the tenancy advice 
services in the period approaching the Olympic Games (Blunden, 2007, 21). In spite of these 
signals, the Government did not put into place legislation protecting tenants because in their 
assessments it remained ambiguous whether the increased rents were attributable to the 
Games (Blunden, 20-22). This is in line with the policy trends of weakly regulated rental 
markets in New South Wales (Blunden, 2007, 32). Some compromises made in the 
organisation process on this issue are questionable and illustrate the unawareness or 
unwillingness to address housing issues in the Olympic context. An example is that the 
Olympic village was sold on the private market as part of the public-private partnership that 
was established for its construction (Blunden, 2007). 
 
Case Study: Athens 2004 
 In the case of Athens, a stronger negative effect on the right to housing is prevalent 
even though civil society actors were better represented in ATHOC (Athens Organising 
Committee). Several boards and committees were set up in relation to the ATHOC, including 
representatives from all spheres in the broader network or the core configuration of the 
ATHOC (ATHOC, 2005, 87-91). Public actors played a significant role in the ATHOC and 
associated bodies (ATHOC, 2005, 87-89; 92-93), however financial contributions were small 
compared to that of the private sector (125; 127; 245). Strong government control over the 
organisation process limited the private sector’s ability to exercise their expertise, as 
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illustrated by the process of designing and building the venues. This was supposed to happen 
through a tendering process but ended up remaining under government control (ATHOC, 
2005, 148). Civil society representatives from a wide variety of groups including immigrants, 
trade unions and religious communities were included in the National Committee for the 
Olympic Games; an advisory body to ATHOC on issues related to the organisation of the 
Games (ATHOC, 2005, 88; 283). This provided them with the ability to exercise expertise 
and resulted in a relatively strong position of civil society actors within the partnership.  
 The games were marketed as ‘homecoming’ of the Olympics providing a perfect 
occasion to merge Hellenic tradition and current potential (Alexandridis, 2007, 8). 
Furthermore, it presented an opportunity to renew the Greek infrastructure and sports 
facilities (ATHOC, 2005, 67). Alexandridis (2005, 11) notes that the housing impact has not 
at all been addressed by the bid corporation except the need for provisions simplifying the 
expropriation of land, leading to the amendment of legal provisions 
The impact of the games on housing rights is classified as negative because it was 
associated with very strong negative effects for the Roma community. Whereas ‘general’ 
expropriations happened without much complaint due to the good deals offered by the 
Government (Alexandridis, 2007, 12), the Roma evictions posed a more pressing issue from a 
human rights perspective. In Greece the Roma community is often subject to forced evictions 
because they do not have the means to buy land or houses. Evictions happened without 
sufficient compensation or help with resettlement, leaving many of the Roma homeless. The 
Olympic preparations were a catalyst for even more forced evictions; a problem that has been 
addressed by various international bodies such as the Commission on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights after having visited the country. In some cases the evictions happened with the 
Olympic Games as an (invalid) excuse (Lenskyj, 194). Roma were evicted from sites in towns 
that were not expecting construction of Olympic facilities (Greek Helsinki Monitor, 1999, 
48). In other cases, they were evicted for the actual construction of Olympic venues to take 
place. In various cases the evictions were paired with demolition of the houses and personal 
belongings. The evictions were happening in the run up to the Games and during the Games. 
(Alexandridis, 2007, 16-27). On the positive side, the Olympic village was converted into 
social housing (Kasimati, 2015, 176), thus providing affordable living facilities. However, the 
Village is rather deserted and decayed, which limits the pleasure of living there (Govan, 
2001).  
What is striking is that even though civil society actors were relatively strongly 
integrated into the organising partnership, the amount of domestic advocates defending Roma 
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rights was limited. Almost all advocacy work on the side of the Roma was performed by 
international human rights groups. Other explanations are the lack of a more general human 
rights advocacy group or a positive public opinion on the Olympic Games, which could lead 
to less scrutiny. (Alexandridis, 2007, 29-31) 
 
Exploration of Other Conditions  
The literature review establishes that the composition of the organising partnership 
and the salience of actors within it could explain the varying impact of the Games on the 
fulfilment of the right to housing. In addition to these factors, several characteristics are 
associated with successful delivery of services to vulnerable groups, which are likely to be 
disadvantaged by a negative impact of the games (Minnaert, 2011).  The conditions presented 
by Baud & Dhanalakshmi (2008) were examined in the case studies. Table 3 presents a 
comparison of the results.
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Condition Sydney 2000 Athens 2004 
Clear accountability in 
delegation of tasks, 
information and 
funding 
Clear lines of accountability are in place (Blunden, 2007; 
Hall& Hodges, 1996)  
Clear lines of accountability are in place 
(ATHOC, 2005, 87-94) 
Fit into local context Games as a means of gentrification tendencies pre-dating the 
Olympics (Blunden, 2007, 18). Poor fit regarding tight housing 
market, but the location of the games in former wasteland 
Homebush Bay was well thought out (Chalkley & Essex, 1999) 
Games used to update sports infrastructure in 
and around Athens. Many of these structures are 
no longer in use now, illustrating that there was 
no need for an update. As such, there was 
somewhat of a poor fit in the local context. 
Agreement on goals, 
means and outcomes 
Lacking; only promise in bidding stage was that there would be 
no acquisition of private land (Blunden, 2007, 12). Concerns of 
civil society actors for escalating rent and housing prices and 
the rights of homeless people were not addressed (Blunden, 
2007; Hall & Hodges, 1996; Lenskyj, 2002) 
Housing impact was not at all addressed by the 
organising committee in the bid stage 
(Alexandridis, 2005). The committee did agree 
to use the Games as a means to update Greek 
infrastructure and sports facilities (ATHOC, 
2005, 67) 
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Appropriateness legal 
framework 
No appropriate legal framework, i.e. because of weakly 
regulated rental markets (Blunden, 2007). The framework was 
changed for the games to facilitate easier development of 
facilities by Olympic bodies (Owen, 2001) 
The legal framework was adapted for the Games 
(ATHOC, 2005, 59-97). A major change 
simplified the process of acquiring land for the 
Government (Alexandridis, 2005, 11; Lenskyj)  
Accountability to 
diverse groups 
Accountability was assured by including various civil society 
groups into the organising framework and establishing the 
Social Issues Advisory Committee, consisting of various social 
and political representatives. (SOCOG, 2001, 333; 339). 
However, the relaxation of the legal framework for 
development projects weakened accountability to citizens for 
instance by disabling the appeals procedures (Owen, 2001)   
Strong incorporation of civil society actors into 
organisation process, however the groups 
included did not advocate the rights of the Roma 
(Alexandridis, 2007, 29-31) 
Trust in diverse 
communities 
Same as above Incorporation of most groups. Further 
marginalisation of Roma not only as a result of 
the outcome, but also of the process. 
 
 
Table 3: Comparison Sydney and Athens 
 
	 21	
Salience of Civil Society Actors 
Salience of civil society actors is identified as an important factor in all QCA solutions. This 
finding supports the hypothesis put forward above, stating that the salience of actors 
influences the magnitude of the impact of the Olympic Games on the right to housing. 
Illustrative of this effect are the Atlanta (salience=0.50) and Beijing (salience=0.38) Games, 
which show a strong negative impact (0.9) on housing rights. In Atlanta, civil society actors 
were included in the organisation process through advisory boards and neighbourhood 
taskforces (ACOG, 1997, 20; 26). In contrast, private and public actors had a more salient 
position (0.88 and 0.75 respectively), because of various consultations of public officials 
(ACOG, 1997, 184; COHRE, 2007, 116) and a leading role in the financing and bidding 
process for private actors (ACOG, 1997, 184; 21; 26). The salience of civil society actors in 
the Beijing Games was limited because they were not represented in the senior leadership of 
the BOCOG Furthermore, public (salience=1) and private (salience=0.63) actors have a 
stronger representation (BOCOG, 2007, 110-112).  
Drawing on the theoretical accounts presented before, these findings indicate that civil 
society actors are ‘needed’ in the partnership as advocates defending housing rights. 
Following Provan & Milward, negative community impacts can be explained by a lack of 
representation of these interests in the NAO. Furthermore, Mitchell et al (1997) argue that 
stakeholders that are salient in a network have a stronger position to promote their interest in 
the partnership. Interpreted in light of these theories, these findings thus show that by not 
being (as strongly) represented in the organising partnership, civil society or community 
actors lose their voice in the Olympic decision making process. Without civil society actors 
able to push for respect of housing rights in the partnership due to a lack of salience therein, 
the impact on this type of rights is not a priority for the partnership. This is illustrated by the 
case studies. Especially in the case of Athens, the Roma suffered from serious violations of 
their right to housing with hardly any protest from civil society. The case of Sydney shows 
that such protest can be rather effective, as it led to guarantees regarding the rights of 
homeless people throughout the Olympics.  
  A side-note to this finding is that there is no full overlap between membership in the 
category representing lack of civil society salience and the category representing a strong 
negative impact on housing rights. As shown by the consistency score of 0.97 and graph 3 in 
appendix 4, one case (London) does not behave as expected. In London, the negative effect of 
the Olympics on the right to housing was slightly smaller but still apparent (impact=0.6). 
Following the QCA outcome, this could be explained by the high salience of public and 
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private actors (salience=0,75 and 0.88 respectively) and low salience of civil society actors 
(0.38) resulting from their indirect representation in the decision making process. Public 
actors were strong because they provided a large proportion of the funds and retained control 
over the budget (LOCOG, 2012, 54; 87). Furthermore, they were strongly represented in the 
London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG, 2012, 64) and the Olympic 
Delivery Authority (2008, 2). Private actors scored high on expertise and funding, but less on 
representation in the partnership. This shows that, although salience of civil society actors 
may be sufficient to bring about a negative impact, it does not necessarily explain its 
magnitude. 
In line with this finding, the Athens case study shows that strong salience of civil 
society actors does not ‘automatically’ imply the safeguarding of housing rights. Rather, it 
draws attention to two of the factors identified by Baud & Dhanalakshmi (2008), namely the 
accountability to diverse groups and trust in diverse communities. The case studies show that 
if the partnership is held accountable for (expected) violations as in Sydney, this can lead to a 
more positive impact on housing rights. In contrast, the Athens case illustrates that when this 
accountability does not exist and when certain groups are not included in the partnership, the 
outcome can be disastrous for specific groups. Looking at this from the theoretical perspective 
on the intensity of network links and influence on the outcome put forward by Akkerman & 
Torenvlied, an explanatory factor for the lack of Roma interests being protected in Olympic 
outcomes could be the lack of network links between Roma people and the organising 
committee, or perhaps the weakness of network links between Roma people and broader 
networks like the Athens’ community or local administration following their marginalized 
position. The Sydney Olympics pose a positive example in this regard: many links existed 
between the homeless community and the organising partnership through multiple NGOs 
advocating their interests, which ended up to be better protected by guarantees. Another 
interesting finding is that almost all editions of the Games have a disproportionately negative 
effect on minority groups (see table 2), which is in line with Minnaert’s (2011) findings. 
 
Corruption 
The second important factor identified by the QCA is corruption. Although this factor was not 
formally hypothesised to have an impact, it was included as a control variable because of its 
(potential) impact on the outcome (Baud & Dhanalakshmi, 2008). The analysis shows that 
this was done rightfully so as higher degrees of corruption are associated with a stronger 
negative impact of the Games on housing rights. As shown by the consistency-score of 1 
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(visualized in graph 4 appendix 4), there is full overlap between membership in the corruption 
and impact categories. Furthermore, a causal pathway combining strong public and private 
actors and high corruption returns the same results (see graph 1 in appendix 4). Additionally, 
a strong position for public and private actors alone is not a sufficient causal combination for 
a negative impact to occur (see graph 5 appendix 1). When combined with corruption, the 
causal pathway becomes sufficient. These results provide support for the importance of this 
factor as an explanatory factor for the impact of Olympic Games on the fulfilment of housing 
rights.  
The sufficient character of corruption is illustrated by the Beijing (corruption=4.6) and 
Athens (corruption=4.3) Olympics, which both have a high corruption perception index and a 
negative impact of the Games on housing rights. In Athens, public authorities exercised firm 
control over the partnership and the organisation process (salience=0.88), but the private 
sector was also salient because of large financial contributions (salience=0.63). Despite a 
strong position of civil society actors (salience=0.75) the effect of the Games on housing 
rights was still predominantly negative (impact=0.6), because of the high corruption 
perception index. Furthermore, the Beijing Olympics, controversial from a human rights 
perspective because China does not protect all internationally declared human rights (Worden, 
2008), illustrates this causal pathway. The public sector was exceptionally salient (1) in this 
organising partnership because the vast majority of members of the organising committee 
stem from governmental bodies (BOCOG, 2007, 111). In addition, the private actors 
(salience=0.63) involved in the Beijing Organising Committee or contracted by it were 
usually representatives of state-owned businesses (BOCOG, 2007, 73; 97-98), which further 
signals government control over the organisation process. Combined with corruption, this 
combination of factors gave rise to a strong negative impact (0.9) on the fulfilment of housing 
rights in the Beijing area.    
There are numerous potential explanations for this effect. Several studies indicate that 
corrupt officials do not take as much note of citizens’ interests, which can lead to negative 
consequences for the community (Myint, 2000, 50). Furthermore, corruption limits political 
challenge and accountability (Johnston, 1997), which is a crucial indicator for the 
performance of public service delivery (Davis, 2004). In the housing sector, this could mean 
that citizens cannot effectively challenge a decision, for instance through appeals procedures. 
Furthermore, the partnership structure in the OCOGs enhances the accessibility of public and 
private sector officials to one another. Such accessibility can facilitate corruption by creating 
opportunities for influence (Johnston, 1997). In order to establish the exact dynamic between 
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corruption and the impact of the Olympic Games on housing rights, further research is 
necessary. 
 
Conclusion 
  
The research question posed in the beginning of this paper is as follows; why do different 
editions the Olympic Games have a varying impact on their environment? The aim of this 
research project was to take a first step along a relatively new avenue of research; the negative 
impact of the Olympic Games on its surroundings. Through exploratory research, factors have 
been identified that could contribute to an explanation for these negative impacts; in 
particular, the involvement of civil society actors in the organisation process and the 
prevalence of corruption. As this is an exploratory and inductive research project, these 
findings have to be interpreted cautiously. However, their explanatory potential is grounded in 
established theories and prior research by respected scholars. For these reasons, the factors 
identified in this research project merit further research. Even though this project in itself may 
not have lead to ‘hard claims’ on the causes of negative impact related to the Olympics, it has 
fulfilled its aim if negative effects and human rights impact in particular are pushed on the 
research agenda. It is crucial that more research on these topics is conducted, for the people 
affected, the enrichment of academic knowledge and for the future of the Olympic movement.  
This research could serve as a stepping stone for explaining varying or unwanted 
outcomes in the Olympic research agenda. In the broader network management or public 
private partnership research agenda, these findings support and bring together existing 
research. Several suggestions for future research can be derived from this study. First of all, 
hypothesis one on the effect of the type of actors included in the partnership on the impact of 
the Games cannot formally be tested due to lacking variance across cases. However, the fact 
that the position of actors in terms of salience is proven to be relevant for the effect offers a 
positive background for further research on the impact of presence and absence of certain 
actors. Second, both causal combinations put forward by the QCA include high salience of 
public actors in the partnership. Together with corruption this could, potentially, be explained, 
however in other cases it would be more intuitive to expect that public actors aim to advance 
citizens interests for various political reasons. A more extensive research project on the role 
of public actors in the partnership would be interesting to enlighten this relationship. Third, 
the case of London, characterized by low civil society salience but only a moderately negative 
effect, shows that there might be more to the relationship than explored in this research. 
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Several factors may be mitigating the magnitude of the effect, which merit further 
exploration.   
 Drawing practical recommendations based on this research project is complicated due 
to its inductive and exploratory character. However, with an increasing focus on the human 
rights issues related to recent editions of the Olympic Games, the Olympic movement cannot 
turn its cheek to these issues. In order to improve and truly contribute to peace and a better 
world as the IOC aspires, the causes of these issues have to be identified; this is where the 
academic community should take its responsibility. The importance of corruption as a 
contextual factor and the underling causal mechanisms should be further explored, so that it 
can be taken into account by the Olympic community. Additionally, drawing on the research 
findings, a strong argument for better inclusion of civil society groups, with a specific focus 
on minority groups and those groups most likely to be (negatively) affected, can be made. 
More generally, the findings of this research project and the factors included in it support the 
arguments in favour of hosting the Olympics at one or a couple of places. Not only will this 
make sure that the investments made are not in vein, but also this will allow for controlling 
contextual factors and making sure that the negative impacts do not ‘move around’ together 
with the games.  
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Appendix 1: Coding Scheme Configuration Network 
Presence of actors: 
Present (1) if: -      Representative included in the OCOG; 
- Representative included in organising body related to OCOG; or 
- Representative included in formalized secondary body such as a forum, 
advisory committee or framework of workshops intended to influence the 
organisation 
Absent (0) if: -     No representative included in either of the above 
 
Power of actors: 
0 if:  -    Not represented in partnership and no control of funds 
0.25 if: -     Weak representation in partnership, for instance only in a secondary body; 
        or  
  -     Control of a small proportion of the funds 
0.50 if: -     Moderate representation in partnership, for instance in the primary        
      partnership; or 
- Control of a large proportion of the funds; or 
- Weak representation in partnership and control of a small proportion of the 
funds 
0.75 if: -     Strong representation in partnership, for instance multiple seats in the  
      primary partnership; or 
- Control of (practically) all the funds; or 
- Weak representation in partnership and control of a large proportion of the 
funds; or 
- Moderate representation in partnership and control of a small proportion of 
the funds 
1 if:  -     Moderate representation in partnership and control of a large 
       proportion of the funds; or 
- Strong representation in partnership and control of a small proportion of the 
funds; or 
- Strong representation in partnership and control of a large proportion of the 
funds 
Expertise of Actors: 
	 34	
An important note in the coding of this variable is that rather than just possessing the 
expertise, the actor also must be able to utilize its expertise within the framework of the 
partnership. An example can be a civil society actor that is asked to share its opinion on a 
certain matter. The actor can also have a relevant network of citizens, however unless access 
to that network becomes relevant in the partnership it is not taken into account in the coding.  
0 if:    -      No specific knowledge, skills or access to people, networks or materials  
       not possessed by other actors 
0.25 if: -     Specific knowledge, skills or access to people, networks or materials not  
possessed by other actors, which plays a minor role in the organisation 
process 
0.50 if: -     Specific knowledge, skills or access to people, networks or materials not  
       possessed by other actors, which plays a large role in the organisation 
       process; or 
  -     A combination of knowledge, skills and access, which play a minor role on       
       the organisation process; or 
- Specific knowledge, skills and/or access, which are of minor importance 
but can be categorized in more than 1 field relevant to the organisation (i.e. 
construction and management)  
0.75 if: -      A combination of specific knowledge, skills or access to people, networks  
or materials not possessed by other actors, which plays a large role in the 
organisation process; or 
- Specific knowledge, skills and/or access, which are of major importance 
but can be categorized in more than 1 field relevant to the organisation (i.e. 
construction and management)  
1 if:  -     Specific knowledge, skills and/or access that is crucial to the successful  
        organisation of the Olympic Games 
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Appendix 2: Raw Data Table 
 
  Power Expertise Index Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Impact 
Housing 
(DV) 
 
Atlanta 
Public 0.50 1 0.75 7.60 0.9 
Private 0.75 1 0.88 
Civil 
Society 
0.50 0.50 0.50 
 Public 1 0.75 0.88 9.20 0.3 
Sydney Private 0.50 0.75 0.63 
 Civil 
Society 
0.50 0.75 0.63 
 Public 1 0.75 0.88 4.30 0.6 
Athens Private 0.50 0.75 0.63 
 Civil 
Society 
0.75 0.75 0.75 
 Public 1 1 1 4.60 0.9 
Beijing Private 0.25 1 0.63 
 Civil 
Society 
0.50 0.25 0.38 
 Public 1 0.50 0.75 7.4 0.6 
London Private 0.75 1 0.88 
 Civil 
Society 
0.25 0.50 0.38 
 
 
 
NB: The inversions and calibrations described in the operationalization section have to be 
applied to the data in the table above, in order to achieve the same results.  
 
Table	2:	Raw	Data	Table	
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Appendix 3: Truth Table 
 
IndexPubCal IndexPrivCal IndexCivCal TIIndexInvCal number ImpactHousing raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0.959184 0.909091 0.987654 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0.824324 0.606061 0.606061 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0     
1 0 0 0 0     
0 1 0 0 0     
0 0 1 0 0     
1 0 1 0 0     
0 1 1 0 0     
0 0 0 1 0     
1 0 0 1 0     
0 1 0 1 0     
0 0 1 1 0     
1 0 1 1 0     
0 1 1 1 0     
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Appendix 4: FsQCA Output and Associated Tables 
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Graph 1: Salience public actors * Salience private actors * Corruption on Impact Housing Rights 
 
Graph 2: Salience public actors* Salience private actors * Absence Civil society actors on Impact housing Rights 
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Graph 3: Absence civil society actors on Impact housing rights 
 
Graph 4: Corruption on Impact housing rights 
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Graph 5: Salience public actors  on Impact housing rights 
 
